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The operating areas of each terrestrial broadcasting station in Japan are geographically 
divided by a licensing system and form oligopolies in each of their respective markets. 
These institutional constraints define the market structure, and as a result, affect the 
business performance of the broadcasting industry. The primary purpose for regulation is 
based on the “Media Ownership Rule,” a rule designed for preserving “plurality,” 
“diversity” and ”localism” of stations. Similar rules exist in many countries, but 
benchmarks differ. To this end, if the regulative authority introduced a new regulation 
framework, it might be useful to improve the financial foundation of the licensed stations, 
thus preserving the original purpose of the rule. With the rapid progress of digital 
technology and the increasingly diversified selection of media types, the government 
needs to urgently review Japan’s old regulations with the aim of giving more freedom in 
the operation of terrestrial stations and so promote voluntary restructuring. 
 
Based on the above viewpoints, we implemented an econometric analysis with respect to 
factors that affect on the business performance (especially on profit) of each station. We 
focus on the terrestrial broadcasting industry because it plays a central role in the 
Japanese broadcasting system. As a result, we ascertained the following points.  
(1) Structural parameters: market share of each station has a positive correlation with 
profit, although market concentration appears to have no correlation.  
(2) Geographical parameters: the number of households per station and the income per 
household have positive correlations. 
(3) Business parameters: the aired ratio of self-produced TV programs has a positive 
correlation with revenue, although it has a negative correlation with profit. 
 
It is said that geographical environment is quite important for business performance in 
the broadcasting industry. This hypothesis is strongly supported by our results. Therefore 
deregulation and subsequent voluntary rearrangement may reinforce the operating basis 
of each station.  
 
Keywords: Terrestrial Broadcasting Station, Determinants of profit, Principle of Media 
Ownership Rule, Audience Share, Oligopoly  
 






1. Background  
Recently, it has been said that the business performance of terrestrial broadcasting 
stations will deteriorate in the near future with the coming drastic change in the business 
environment. In accord with these misgivings, the regulating authority (the Ministry of 
Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, hereinafter referred 
to as “MPHPT”) has reviewed the “Media Ownership Rule1” (hereinafter referred to as 
“MOR”)2. The MOR was originally designed to preserve “plurality,” “diversity” 
and ”localism” of the stations3. It regulates the geographical operating areas of stations; 
basically following prefectural boundaries as administrative units, and restricts the 
number of holding or controlling stations as one regulative principle4. Therefore, it can be 
said that the MOR and related regulation creates an oligopoly in each of the terrestrial 
broadcasting markets. Such framework of regulation on the basis of the operating area 
and the accumulation of station ownership hadn’t been changed at of this time review. On 
the other hand, the report also pointed out the necessity of discussion and examination in 
respect to the introduction of other benchmarks such as the number of households or 
audience share. These kinds of measures might be useful to improve the financial bases of 
the stations.  
 
The traditional SCP hypothesis is that profit in the broadcasting industry comes from 
performance (P) in the market induced from market structure (S) and market conduct (C). 
In this sense, profits are the direct indicators of stable operating foundations for stations. 
Therefore, in this paper, with respect to terrestrial broadcasting stations, which play a 
central role in the Japanese broadcasting industry, we empirically estimate the various 
††††††††††††
1 The rule for regulating acquisitions or mergers between terrestrial stations forces stations to in principle 
operate within one prefecture, except for Tokyo, Osaka and the Aichi metropolitan areas. It also restricts the 
upper limit of the capital ratio: for a broadcasting station within the same service area, one-tenth of voting 
rights or less, whereas for a broadcasting station within a different service area, less than one-fifth of voting 
rights. Like this, it has prevented certain stations from having influential power in the mass communication 
field.  
2 The report issued by the MPHPT (February, 2003) set out their policy that the MPHPT deregulate the MOR 
and allow mergers of two adjunct local stations, or the operation of a bankrupt station as a subsidiary. As we 
can see in their report, the MPHPT expects efficient operation and reinforcement of operating foundations, 
subsequent reservation of high-quality content, and smooth transition to digital broadcasting services by 
deregulation of the MOR. Especially the MPHPT looks at drastic deregulation of local stations with some 
conditions because their business performance might be worsened in the near future. 
3 Originally the MOR was designed with two principles: one is the restriction of the number of stations 
considering the scarcity of frequency; the other is the decentralization of social influence through TV 
programming.  
4 As an exception, one company is allowed to operate both a middle-wave radio station and a TV station in the 
same area.   
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(structural, geographical and business) factors affecting profit; thereby, examining 
effective institutional factors to enhance operating foundations. 
 
The structure of our paper is as follows. In section 2, we survey previous research. In 
section 3, we briefly review the economic features of the terrestrial broadcasting industry. 
In section 4, we explain our base model for estimation. In section 5, we examine the 
estimation results腁 and in section 6 we overview the current business environment for 




2. Previous Empirical Studies on Television Station Profitability 
In discussing their economic analysis of the Japanese broadcasting industry, Takeuchi 
(1993), Mitsufuji (1995) and Yasuda (2000) used station-based data and focused on the 
determinants of profit / revenue.  
 
Using the JNN network data, Takeuchi (1993) classified station revenue as main office 
revenue / branch revenue / key station revenue5 and showed that the “sum of branch and 
key station revenue of each station” has a significant positive correlation with the number 
of households and GRP (Gross Rating Point). He also showed that the “sum of station 
revenue in a certain prefecture” has a negative correlation with “the number of stations in 
that prefecture.” There are five major networks in Japan and it is well known that the key 
station in each network has to subsidize local stations to maintain a national 
broadcasting service. Thus, any reduction of revenue per station must be subsidized by 
the key station in the above situation. Based on this result, he pointed out that the power 
of a key station towards a local station will be enhanced if many terrestrial stations are 
set up. 
 
Mitsufuji (1995) analyzed the effect of the entry of a new station on the operating revenue 
of an incumbent TV station. After regressing the sum of total operating revenue on GRP 
in  a certain prefecture, he found that operating revenue is highly dependant on past 
revenue, and the entry of a new station increased revenue in that market by around 2 
††††††††††††
5 The word “branch revenue” means revenue from branch located in key station area or in quasi-key station 
area, whereas “key station revenue” means distributed revenue from key station (key station signs up for 
advertisement as a representative of network). It is said that the revenue ratio from main office / branch / key 
station is around 2:5:3. Of course it is favorable to analyze based on each kind of revenue respectively, but we 
couldn’t get revenue ratio data. It is remain to be solved in future.   
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billion yen. Yasuda (2000), using network based data, regressed annual ordinary revenue 
on an average network dependent rate, annual sales, previous ordinary revenue, nominal 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) etc. and found that the higher the average network 
dependent rate, the greater the ordinary profit.  
 
In the United States, on the other hand, analyses on determinants of revenue / profit have 
been implemented since ’70. The reasons being: (1) The FCC (Federal Communications 
Commission) decided on a policy of licensing an increased number of broadcasting station, 
and so stimulated an open discussion, and (2) cable TV had become widely used and 
advertising using cable TV’s basic channels began to increase around that period. 
Greenberg (1969) provide one of the early analyses. He used 1960-62 data and showed 
that the profit of a station is positively correlated with audience size, network affiliation, 
and number of stations in the market. He also analyzed the cost advantage of UHF (Ultra 
High Frequency) / VHF (Very High Frequency) for to discuss whether the FCC’s licensing 
policy was correct or not; though no clear result emerged.  
 
We can see that Greenberg’s success largely depends on his finding that revenue / profit is 
strongly correlated with number of households per station. After Greenberg’s paper, 
much research was implemented using this environmental variable. Webbink (1973) 
analyzed the relationship with a new entry into the area of an existing station. Besen 
(1976) considered the relationship with the price of advertising. On the other hand, 
Fisher et al. (1980) researched the relationship with advertisement revenue and subsidy 
from an affiliated network, using actual audience data as a replacement for a potential 
audience (=number of household). Although Fournier (1986)’s primary purpose was to 
measure the impact of VHF/UHF on business performance and to analyze the FCC’s 
licensing policy, his estimate equations had similar structures to the above research. 
Fournier tried to refine previous research by clarifying the definitions of “market” 
and ”profit.” 
 
More recent empirical research includes that by Ekelund et al. (2000a) and Ekelund et al. 
(2000b). The former empirically examined the relationship between market concentration 
and profit in the U.S. radio market, while the latter analyzes the relationship between 
each terrestrial broadcasting market based on advertising revenue. We refer to these 
reports again in section 5.  
 
In the following section, we analyze the relationship between revenue / profit and the 
business environment surrounding the broadcasting industry in Japan, referring to 




3. The Characteristics of Terrestrial Broadcasting Industry  
To clarify our hypothesis through empirical research, we take a brief look at the economic 
features of the revenue/cost/market structure of a broadcasting station.  
 
 
3.1. Cost Structure  
The operating cost of a broadcasting station can primarily be classified as content 
procurement costs and transmission costs. This cost structure is somewhat different 
between a key and a local station. In essence, production costs are higher for a key station 
while transmission costs are higher for a local station.  
 
Because TV programming is an important input for determining the value of the 
advertisement service, broadcasting stations must prepare popular programs if they are 
to earn a profit. However, because program production is labor intensive, and needs a 
large initial cost but less marginal re-production cost, there exits strong economy of scale 
in the process of program production.  Therefore, it is quite important for a station to 
avoid or to decentralize this cost burden, or it must efficiently recover its cost. From this 
aspect, we can regard the current network affiliation system as a method to decentralize 
cost burdens to achieve the production of popular TV programs6. In short, a key station is 
in charge of purchasing content or acquiring advertising revenue as a representative of its 
affiliated stations; on the other hand, affiliated local stations serve as a means of 
distributing TV programs and advertisements. Conversely, in respect to local TV 
programs, these bear a heavy cost burden for each station because it is difficult to 
decentralize their costs.  
 
Transmission cost primarily consists of two kinds: (1) maintenance and management 
costs for the intermediary station used for transmitting the station signal, and (2) Costs 
for using micro wave links provided by telecommunications carriers, to distribute 
programs to local stations. The equipment used in a broadcasting service are mainly 
††††††††††††
6 Although the 127 broadcasting stations in Japan are legally individual enterprises, most stations affiliate 
with the five major networks (NNN, JNN, FNS, ANN and TXN). Even in the case that stations are not 
affiliate with a network, these scales are quite small. In an actual market, the network affiliation system is 
allowed for the purpose of joint sales or joint production of TV programs, nevertheless MOR exists. So 
affiliated stations tend to depend on key stations for know-how on program production or advertisement sales. 
Capital relationships are also very complex.   
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one-way radio transmitters, which are suitable for distribution over a wide area. 
Therefore, it can be said that transmission costs tend to be digressive as target household 
density increases7.  
 
 
3.2. Revenue Structure    
Terrestrial broadcasting stations obtain revenue primarily from advertising; this revenue 
is classified as “time” or “spot,” and is further classified as “for national” “for local”8  
 
Revenue from time advertisements is proportional to the station cost because production 
and airwave costs for providing TV programs are basically financed by the revenue from 
advertising. On the other hand, the price for spot advertisements is determined based on 
the “cumulative audience rate” and ”reach cost per thousand people,” so advertising 
revenue is affected by audience rate and the number of households in each operating area. 
Because advertising time is restricted, it is reasonable to consider that demand and 
supply are adjusted through the advertising prices. Therefore, the profit of each station 
depends largely on revenue from spot advertisement. 
 
Considering the classifications of “for national” / “for local,” it can be seen that 
advertisement services are geographically differentiated. Therefore, it is easy to assume 
that the price for an advertisement is affected by structural parameters (audience 
(market) share) and geographical parameters (The number of households per station, and 
income per household)9.  
 
 
3.3. Market Structure 
Each broadcasting station provides CM (Commercial Message) time for advertisers as an 
opportunity to reach out to an audience. In this business model, the price for an 
advertisement functions as a signal for reflecting evaluation and/or outcomes in the 
††††††††††††
It is sometimes pointed out that the diminishing rate of costs in the broadcasting industry is not so large 
compared to other public utility enterprises, such as Gas, Water and Electricity. Refer to Chapter 3, Sugaya 
and Nakamura ed.  (2000). 
“Time advertisement” means the sales method that commercial time is combined with a TV program 
(30min/60min). On the other hand, “spot advertisement” is televised during a “station break,” which is set 
between programs (1min in principle).
It is said that advertising revenue is a quadratic function of audience size, such that revenue increases at 
an accelerating pace with audience size. Refer to Mizuho Corporate Ginko (2002).  
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market. In addition, as a result of licensing system and entry regulation this terrestrial 
broadcasting market forms an oligopoly in each prefecture. Therefore, from the viewpoint 
of advertisers, services provided by stations are differentiated in two ways. In short, a 
broadcasting service is geographically differentiated (the number of operating stations / 
the number of households / income) in a certain market as well as differentiated even 
within the same market: (TV program, program scheduling, and audience share). This 
differentiated oligopoly structure is a quite unique feature of the broadcasting industry. 
Thus, thorough advertisement revenue, the above factors greatly affect the business 
performance of each broadcasting station.   
 
In the following section, we derive our estimation equation based on these economic 
features within the broadcasting industry.  
 
 
4. Profit Equation in Oligopoly Market  
In this section, we derive our estimation equation based on the theoretical relationship 
between profit and the proxy variable of market concentration, considering the fact that 
the operating areas of each station form an oligopoly in the market10.  
 
At first, we assume that advertiser’s demand for terrestrial broadcasting service is 




j j Z X j X f p = = ††††††††††† (1) 
 
X shows the sum of the output of each station ( ∑ = i x X ), whereas Z means the 
demographic indicators in each market. Average and marginal cost of the i th station is 
i c and constant ( ) ( , j i c c j i ≠ ≠ ). Here, profit is shown by the following equation. 
 
i i i i x c x X f − = ) ( π †††††††  †††† (2) 
 



















10 A similar oligopoly structure is found in the banking industry and several reports have been done on this 
in Japan. The following theory and derived equations depend largely on Iwane (1990).   
9
Here, if we describe total output such as  i i X x X − + = , separating the i th and the other 
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If we assume a Cournot market, a market in which other station do not change their 
output when the i th station changes its output, and the conjectural variation,  i λ  shows 

























Summing up all the individual stations, and setting the Herfindahl index as 
2 ) / ( X x X HHI i = , the price elasticity of demand as η , the profit of the whole 
broadcasting industry can be shown as follows:  
 
†   pX HHI x Xc pXx i i i ) / 1 ( η π 腅 = − =  
Substituting equation (1) into p and rearranging the equation, we get the following 
equation, which shows the profit level of a certain industry is closely related to the 
Herfindahl index.  
†
2 1 1
1 0 ) (
j j Z X j j HHI
+ = 腅 π  
 
In short, the profit level of all the industry is closely related to the HHI (Herfindahl Index), 
X (output of the whole industry) and Z (demographic variables). Because π  in above 
equation is the profit of all the industry, we use an additional assumption that 
α π π ) / ( i i MS =  for further transformation of this profit equation with respect to an 
individual station. In other words, we assume that market share  ) ( i MS  is equal to the 
profit ratio of an individual station to the total broadcasting industry. Substituting it into 
the above equation and using a natural log, we can obtain the following equation.  
 
Z a X a HHI a MS a c a i o i ln ln ln ln ln ln 4 3 2 1 + + + + = π  
 
Practically, we use  i RATE  (annual average audience share of each station) as a proxy of  
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i MS  (market share) and scale the variables of each station,  i ASSET  (total amount of gross 
asset of the i th station)11 because the industrial output X is difficult to obtain directly. In 
addition, we introduce control variables to show geographical and business 
characteristics of each station. Finally, our estimation equation is shown as follows12:  
 
 
( ) ) 4 ( ln ln / ln ln ln ln ln ln 6 5 4 3 1 2 1 0 i i i i i i i i e SELF Z N HH ASEET HHI RATE + + + + + + + = α α α α α α α π
 
We use the following variables as the number of households per station, () i N HH /  and 
income per household,  i Y  as “geographical parameters”. In addition, we adopt an aired 
ratio of self-produced TV programs,  i SELF 13 as “business parameters.” Some of the 
explanatory variables, such as the number of households or audience share, are also used 
in other countries as a benchmark for judging the degree of concentration in MOR. We 
propose that we should examine the possibility of introducing these variables as a 
substitutable benchmark in the Japanese MOR14.  
 
To obtain a stationary data set, we took a natural log of each variable. We used various 
data with respect to terrestrial broadcasting stations for three years, from FY 1998 to FY 
200015 16. Because we use panel data, the random/fixed effects are considered on 
††††††††††††
ㄱ We also use “tangible fixed asset” instead of “gross asset” in our estimation model. However we don’t report 
them because these results are mostly similar to our already reported results. 
ㄲ “ln” means “natural logarithm.”
ㄳ We treat  i SELF  as a exogenous variable although it might be natural to be considered as a endogenous 
variable for each station. Because (1) each station cannot necessarily decide the aired-ratio by itself, and (2) it 
is difficult for new entry stations to procure self-produced TV programs because of the lack of production 
know-how. The regulation authority has a directed policy that “each station should broadcast self-produced 
TV programs for more than 10 % of the total hours,” at the time of license renewal. However, there are few 
stations in practice that are able to comply with this guidance. Actually if we focus on stations excluding 
key/quasi-key/backbone stations, (1) only 25.7% (49/191 sample) of stations satisfy the guidance criteria and 
(2) there are only 11 traditional (began operation before 1969) stations that broadcast self-produced TV 
programs for more than 10% of the total hours over a three year period. These facts strongly support our 
treating  i SELF  as an exogenous variable. 
14 As a benchmark of MOR, the number of potential households is adopted in the United States,   the sum of 
the annual average audience share is adopted in Germany and the ratio of total national TV watching time in 
the United Kingdom. Refer to the final report of ”Study Group on Broadcasting Policy (2003).”  
15 Ms. Shiho Iwamoto, who also patiently consolidated all data, and Mr. Kentaro Yoshimura (Applied 
Research Institute, Inc) helped for data input and checking. We y appreciate greatly their help. With respect 
to financial data of stations, we refer to “Nihon Minkan Ho-so Nenkan” (edited by Nihon Minkan Ho-so 
Renmei, issued by Ko-ken syuppan) and “Tsu-shin Sangyo Jittai Cyo-sa Keieitai zaimu Cyo-sa” (implemented 
by Jo-ho Tsu-shin Seisakukyoku, MPHPT). With respect to audience share data, we used the annual average 
rate data of each station from Video Research Inc. With respect to demographic data, we referred to “Zenkoku  
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estimation. We express explanatory variables as  i x , and error terms as  i i i e ε β + = . If 
0 ) , cov( = i i x β , we should adopt a random effect model to preserve consistency and 
efficiency. If  0 ) , cov( ≠ i i x β , then we should adopt a fixed effect model. Suitable models 
are determined by the 
2 χ -based Wu-Hausman test.  
 
 
i RATE 腆annual average audience share of each station17. 
i HHI1  腆Herfindahl index in the market where the i th station operates business 
(calculated based on audience share). 
() i N HH / 腆the number of households per station in the market where the i th station 
operates its business18. 
i Y 腆income per households in the market where i th station operates business. 
i SELF 腆capability for procurement of self-produced TV program by i th station19.  




5. Estimation Results 
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for each variable are shown in tables 1 
and 2, whereas the estimation result is shown in table 3. With respect to the dependent 
variable,  i π , we primarily focus on operating profit (net base) because our model is 
††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††††
Shicyo-son Yo-ran” (edited by Shicyo-son Jichi Kenkyu-kai, issued by Daiichi Ho-ki) and “Kenmin Keizai 
Keisan” (issued by Keizai Kenkyu-syo, Naikakufu). If the operating area includes several prefectures, we sum 
up demographic data in all areas. Nominal data are deflated. In addition, financial data are multiplied by a 
TV ratio if the station operates via both TV and radio.   
ㄶ The reasons for choosing this period are: (1) it was the latest available data set for us to use, (2) we can use 
it as a pooled data set that has almost the same quality with no reservation, because there was only one new 
entry station (Tochigi TV (1999)) and the business performance of the terrestrial broadcasting industry was 
relatively stable during that period.
17 We exclude some stations because of the lack of  i RATE  data. (1) independent UHF stations (# 13) which 
are exempt from statistics, (2) stations which retain the right to audience share data (# 8), (3) stations which 
don’t have data before 2000 (#3).  
18 Explanatory variables such as () i N HH /  and  i Y are also used in Fournier (1986).  
19 At first, we used “the aired-ratio of self-produced TV program” as  i SELF  like Uchiyama (1996) and 
Yasuda (2000). However, the correlation with ( )i N HH /  was high, and it might cause a multicolinearity 
problem. Instead, we use “the aired-ratio of self-produced TV program” multiplied by “the number of years 
since its foundation” as  i SELF . Although the correlation coefficient is still high (0.67), we confirm our results 
are robust through a further estimation from an equation: one is the case without  i SELF , the other is the 
case excluding the large metropolitan areas.   
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induced based directly on profit. In addition, we also estimate an equation with respect to 
operating revenue (gross base),  i R , for comparison. It has sometimes been pointed out 
that the cost minimization principle is not applicable in the broadcasting industry. If this 
hypothesis is correct, it means that cost has importance in respect to companies’ behavior, 
and the suggested explanatory variables are directly connected with only revenue, not 
with profit (= revenue - cost).  
 
The results are shown as equations (i) and (ii). In the Wu-Hausman test, random effects 
are adopted with respect to the profit equation, whereas fixed effects are adopted with 
respect to revenue equation. A fixed effect model shows that each station has a specific 
individual effect while a random effect model shows that each station has no individual 
effect. In other words, revenue seems to be stable each year, but if we include costs in the 
consideration, it appears unstable. Generally, a business practice exists where key 
stations distribute revenue between affiliated stations; in this way revenue is adjusted to 
some extent. Our test results might reflect this fact. Equation (ii) shows greater 
2 R (and 
2 R Adjusted − ) and has a high power for explanation, although the signs of the coefficient 
and the degree of significance are similar. We examine our results individually.  
 
First, we look at the relationship between the explanatory variable  i RATE  and  i HHI1 . 
The proxy of market share, i RATE , is positively significant in both equations, whereas the 
proxy of the coefficient of market concentration,  i HHI1 , is significant only in equation (ii). 
Because our model directly shows the relationship between profit and  i RATE , or i HHI1 , 
we emphasize the result of equation (i). This means that the general hypothesis, “the 
higher the coefficient of market concentration, the higher the profit,” would not be 
supported. This is consistent with Ekelund et al. (2000a), in which the relationship 
between market concentration and profit in U.S. radio market is empirically examined20. 
To avoid the multicolinearlity problem, we also estimate  i RATE  and  i HHI1  separately as 
(i)’ and (i)’’; our findings still holds. Ekelund et al. (2000b) analyzes the relationship 
between each terrestrial broadcasting market and points out that advertisement revenue 
tends to shift to another markets with an increase of the advertisement price in one 
market.  The same mechanism would also be applicable in the Japanese market. This is a 
future issue for discussion.  
 
Next, we take a brief look at the estimation results for ( )i N HH /  and  i Y . If there is no 
entry barrier in the market and perfect competition is realized, a new station will enter a 
††††††††††††
20 In this paper, we focus our analysis only on the terrestrial broadcasting station as a media for 
advertisement. how to treat the effect from another media (especially NHK) is still an unresolved issue.   
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market where () i N HH /  is larger, and finally the number of households per station will 
be equalized, and the degree of correlation with  i π  will be lower. Contrarily, if there is 
certain entry barrier in the market, we expect a positive correlation with  i π  because the 
economic rent is reflected. In respect to  i Y , we expect a positive correlation with i π . For 
an advertiser, because it is a better strategy to advertise to households who have strong 
purchasing power, demand for advertisement in a market with a high household income 
will increase, and as a result,  i π will increase. Coefficients of ( )i N HH /  and  i Y  show a 
significant positive sign. This shows  i π  is larger if the number of households per station 
in the market is larger, and if income per household in the market is larger. MPHPT 
assesses applications for broadcasting licenses considering the economic situation in the 
relevant operating area. In that sense, our result showing that there is some room for  i π  
increased by () i N HH /  and increases in each market is consistent with our expectation. 
This is also consistent with the analysis shown in Fournier (1986).  
 
The variable  i SELF , the aired ratio of self-produced TV programs by the i th station, 
shows a significant negative sign in equation (i) ((i)’ & (i)’’) with respect to operating profit, 
whereas it shows a significant positive sign in equation (ii) with respect to operating 
revenue. From the viewpoint of revenue and profit,  i SELF  can be considered as the proxy 
for measuring the benefit from a network affiliation21. In other words, although the 
revenue of the station that must be procured its TV programs through a network (or they 
must be bought by another production company) is low, the station enjoys the benefits 
from its network affiliation if we consider the cost side. That is, the station whose TV 
programs are self-produced can acquire a larger amount of revenue, but it has to bear the 
corresponding cost burden. Therefore, the correlation sign is reversed if we estimate 
using an equation based on profit considering the cost side.  
 
We also show another estimation result in equation (iii) (total sample 240), excluding 
large sized stations in three metropolitan area (Tokyo, Kansai and Cyu-kyo). Equation 
(iv) (total sample 189) shows the results excluding the three metropolitan area and other 
backbone stations (Stations in Hokkaido, Miyagi, Hiroshima and Fukuoka). Although 
2 R  
(and 
2 R Adjusted − ) and the explanation power of the whole equation decreases, our 
above analysis of each variable is almost the same. In addition, the multicolinearity 
problem with  i SELF  or  i ASSET  is drastically improved. Therefore, we can say our 
estimation results are quite robust. 
 
††††††††††††
21 Yasuda (2000) concluded that “the higher network dependent rate, the larger ordinary profit,” using 
ordinary profit. Because ordinary profit is affected by cost, that result is consistent with ours.    
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From our analysis in this section, we see that the revenue and profit of each station tends 
to be equalized if market share, the number of households per station and income per 
household are equalized. Although market share is highly dependant on managerial 
effort by each station, the number of households per station and the income per household 
are exogenous variables, and can’t be changed under current regulation. If we introduce 
new benchmarks as used in some other countries for reviewing MOR in Japan, it is 
possible to improve the financial foundation of stations, thus preserving the original 
purpose of that rule. Practically, the merger of two adjunct local stations will occur with 
the highest possibility. Even in that case, we propose that the regulatory authority should 
consider the environmental equality of each station.  
 
 
6. Operating Revenue/Profit, the Number of Households per Station and Income 
per Household.  
 
In the previous section, we confirmed that ( )i N HH /  and  i Y  have a significantly positive 
effect on  i π ; therefore, we can say these are also important variables for considering the 
operating foundations of each station. Indeed, there is previous research from the 
viewpoint of entry and profit of stations in the United States, such as Webbink(1973)22. In 
this section, we briefly take a look at the current business environment of each station in 
Japan.  
 
Table 4 places, the business environments for stations in order based on () i N HH /  and  i Y  
in each fiscal year. We show two benchmark lines; one is the national average, the other is 
the average excluding three major-city areas. We can see that the order is quite different 
between the two benchmarks. As well, we show another rank based on the “combined 
index,” which is calculated based on our estimated coefficient of ( )i N HH /  and  i Y .  
 
Looking at the case of Tochigi prefecture. There was only one entry during our targeting 
period, 1998-2000. In the Tochigi market, there were five terrestrial stations in FY 1998 
that provided service for an average 130 thousand households per station. But after the 
entry of Tochigi TV (individual UHF station) in FY 1999, the number of average 
households per station decreased to 110 thousand. Although ( )i N HH /  is lower compared 
to other markets,  i Y  is larger than average. In that sense, Tochigi prefecture seems to be 
††††††††††††
22 Webbink (1973) analyzed new entrant behavior of terrestrial broadcasting stations in the United States 
and concluded that new entrants have a significant positive correlation with the number of households per 
station in the market.   
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a promising market. If we use our “combined index,” Tochigi is placed in a higher rank. 
Greenberg (1969) and Webbink (1973) primarily emphasized the effect from () i N HH / , 
Fournier(1983) pointed out that  i Y  would be also important because it might show a 
“wealth effect.”  We can interpret the Tochigi case as an entry emphasized on  i Y  from the 
viewpoint of business performance.  
 
Each station can attract advertisers by providing popular content (=TV program) and 
obtaining high market share (=audience share). However, it is not easy if we consider the 
cost burden. It will be necessary to seriously consider the efficient operation of terrestrial 
broadcasting stations in the near future, especially in respect to mergers and acquisitions.  
It will be important for this to be discussed while considering the environmental factors.  
 
 
7. Conclusions.  
We summarize our estimation results again with respect to the determinant factors of 
revenue and profit23. .  
(1) Structural parameters: Market share of each station has a positive correlation with 
profit although market concentration appears to have no correlation.  
(2) Geographical parameters: The number of households per station and the income per 
household have a positive correlation. 
(3) Business parameters: The aired ratio of self-produced TV programs has a positive 
correlation with revenue, although it has a negative correlation with profit. 
 
As we demonstrated in section 5, our estimation results show the profit of a broadcasting 
station is strongly affected not only by structural parameters (audience share and market 
concentration), but also by geographical parameters (the number of households and 
income per households) and business parameters (aired ratio of self-produced TV 
programs). Considering the later two parameters are determined by exogenous regulation, 
we find implications for the current broadcasting policy. Especially, our results (1) and (2) 
imply that these kinds of benchmarks might be useful to improve the financial foundation 
of stations, thus preserving the original purpose of the MOR. In addition, as we saw in 
section 6, it is also important to use a combined index of these benchmarks. However, a 
stable operating foundation doesn’t necessarily ensure the presentation of high-quality 
††††††††††††
23It is sometimes said, that from an institutional aspect there are great differences between the broadcasting 
industries of Japan and the United States. However, the results in this paper are consistent with our 
expectations, and are similar to those of previous research. We need to focus more attention on the fact that 
we could obtain these results even in the Japanese broadcasting market, which includes the public 
broadcaster, NHK.   
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content or a smooth transition to digital a broadcasting service; though we think it is at 
least a necessary condition. Our analysis in this paper shows there is the potential for a 
restructuring that will achieve a system suitable for the Japanese terrestrial 
broadcasting system.  
 
After the so-called “bubble crash,” the Japanese economy has struggled with a severe 
recession, one that has been mentioned as being “the lost decade.” The broadcasting 
industry is not an exception. As well, digitalization is expected to drastically change the 
current network affiliation system. It also promotes competition in the advertising 
market and lowers the entry barrier. Under these circumstances, profits of terrestrial 
broadcasting stations might decrease drastically if the old regulations continue to be 
applied. Regulations restrict the behavior of the regulated firms regardless of the purpose 
of the regulation. Therefore, the current business environment might be improved if the 
MOR measures are reviewed; being ones which are regulated from the viewpoint of a 
social aspect rather than an economic one. This is one of the primary points that we make 
in this paper. With a purpose to promote voluntary restructuring of each station, efforts to 
review old regulations, will also increase the economic welfare of the audience. After 
designing institutional arrangements with respect to the terrestrial broadcasting 
industry, it might be possible to present a grand design for the whole broadcasting 
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R annual revenue of each station 20613020 507241 953966 318589400
lnR ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 15.9447 1.0201 13.7684 19.5794
菎 annual profit of each station 2167510 68901 2468 62498160





7.8801 2.1519 2.2000 14.5000
lnRATE ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 2.0212 0.3125 0.7885 2.6741
HHI1 䡥牦楮摡桬⁩湤數⁣慬捵污瑥搠畳楮朠剁呅 0.2627 0.0444 0.2120 0.3573
lnHHI1 ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 -1.3496 0.1584 -1.5512 -1.0292
HH/N
the number of households per station in
the market where i th station operates
business 405634.5 583915.2 92565.0 2637072.0
ln(HH/N) ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 12.4195 0.8377 11.4357 14.7852
Y
income per households in the market
where i th station operates business 10.3746 1.6062 7.2810 13.0832
lnY ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 2.3270 0.1593 1.9853 2.5713
SELF
capability for procurement of self-
produced TV program by each station 0.1093 0.1779 0.0019 0.9368
lnSELF ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 -2.9161 1.1971 -6.2418 -0.0653
ASSET
total amount of gross asset of each
station 24285760 603601 1024709 399340700
lnASSET ⡮慴畲慬⁬潧慲楴桭 16.1179 1.0382 13.8399 19.8053
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0
9
1
7
5
0
4
.
4
腀
䅶
敲
慧
3
7
3
3
8
5
.
0
䅶
敲
慧
1
0
9
8
4
8
2
3
.
9
腀
 
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
1
9
6
3
5
8
.
0
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
9
9
5
5
0
1
5
.
1
腀
 
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
1
9
6
7
1
3
.
0
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
9
5
8
0
8
3
2
.
9
腀
 
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
1
9
8
8
4
7
.
0
䅶
敲
慧
攠
睩
瑨
潵
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
9
6
1
6
4
4
1
.
5
腀
㩁
癥
牡
来
⁌
楮
攠
數
捬
畤
楮
朠
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
㩁
癥
牡
来
⁌
楮
攠
數
捬
畤
楮
朠
桲
敥
⁍
慩
渠
䅲
敡
㩁
癥
牡
来
⁌
楮
攠
數
捬
畤
楮
朠
周
牥
攠
䵡
楮
⁁
牥
㩎
慴
楯
湡
氠
䅶
敲
慧
攠
䱩
湥
㩎
慴
楯
湡
氠
䅶
敲
慧
攠
䱩
湥
㩎
慴
楯
湡
氠
䅶
敲
慧
攠
䱩
湥